ANTHRAX

STATEMENT OF

REAR ADMIRAL LOWELL JACOBY

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE,

JOINT STAFF, J2

BEFORE THE 106TH CONGRESS

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

ON THE

ANTHRAX BIOLOGICAL WARFARE THREAT

13 APRIL 2000

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for

inviting me to testify. I am pleased to present an unclassified intelligence

overview of the anthrax threat.

Overview

The Intelligence Community assesses that anthrax is the leading

biological warfare threat agent. The potential for terrorist use of this agent is

also of concern to us based on the relative ease with which it can be produced.

Anthrax is considered an anti-personnel biological warfare agent. However, it

also has economic warfare applications for anti-agricultural use against

livestock.

What is Anthrax?

Anthrax is a naturally occurring disease of herbivores like sheep, cattle,

and goats. This disease occurs worldwide, and particularly in areas where

animals are not routinely vaccinated, such as in Asia and Africa. A spore

forming bacteria causes the disease. In the spore form, the bacteria are

resistant to environmental effects and demonstrate a high level of stability.

There are three modes of exposure. One form occurs usually on the

hands and forearms of persons working with infected livestock. Mortality rate

ranges up to 25%. The gastrointestinal form is contracted by ingestion of

insufficiently cooked contaminated meat. The mortality rate can range up to

70%. The third way anthrax is contracted is by inhalation of anthrax spores.

The fatality rate is virtually 100%. Because airborne anthrax spores have the

ability to infect large numbers over a large coverage area, inhalational anthrax

is the primary concern for biological warfare.

In inhalation anthrax, the spores are inhaled into the lungs and migrate

to the lymph nodes in the cavity between the lungs. Once in the lymph nodes,

the spores germinate and produce toxins, which cause massive internal tissue

destruction and swelling. The bacteria can also enter the blood and cause

blood poisoning. The first symptoms can appear one to several days after

inhalation, and include general flu-like symptoms, fever and fatigue. Severe

respiratory distress and then death will occur in 24-36 hours.

Anthrax – An Ideal Organism for Biological Warfare

Anthrax is an ideal organism for biological warfare use. Anthrax is 100%

lethal if not treated before symptoms appear. There is no effective treatment

available once symptoms have occurred. This is a critical issue for troops since

there is no indication of exposure to anthrax until after the symptoms have

appeared – and then it is too late.

Anthrax spores can be produced in large quantities with basic biological

techniques. It grows easily and can be used as a dry powder or as slurry

(slush) for aerosol spray. Anthrax spores can be stored for decades without

losing their viability. They can be delivered by missiles, rockets, artillery, and

sprayers. Anthrax can be stored in filled munitions, as well as in dry or liquid

bulk.

Anthrax particles can be achieved in the 1-5 micron range, which is

optimal for suspending absorbed biological warfare agent in an aerosol cloud

and carrying it over long distances. This range also represents the optimal

particle size for inhalation exposure.

The equipment for anthrax spore production is dual use. Illegal

production can be concealed in legitimate production industries. Additionally,

legitimate public health and veterinarian needs for vaccines and bio-pesticides

can camouflage agent production.

Anthrax is considered a cost-effective alternative to other weapons of

mass destruction methods. A smaller quantity is required for the same area of

coverage when compared to other weapons of mass destruction means. For

comparison, for 120 square kilometers of coverage, you would need onemegaton

yield of nuclear material, 158 metric tons of a chemical agent, and

only 6.5 kilograms of anthrax. Anthrax is 100,000 times more lethal than

chemical agents.

Vulnerabilities

With no advance warning of an anthrax attack, we will have no

indication that the attack has occurred. Anthrax has no smell, no taste, no

color, and no odor. The aerosol cloud of anthrax will not be detected.

Weaponization Conditions

In order for anthrax to be used as an effective biological warfare agent, it

must be weaponized. Optimal delivery involves release of the agent in a

particle cloud suspended in air (aerosol), light wind conditions and dispersion

in non-daylight hours to minimize the dilution of the aerosol cloud and light

induced degradation of the agent.

The aerosol anthrax particles would remain suspended in air and travel

with the wind currents for a considerable distance. If disseminated at night

near the ground or water surface, they can be expected to form a cloud with

the potential to remain relatively intact for several hours while slowly moving

across the terrain or water surface. Except for a short time in the immediate

vicinity of the release, the aerosol will not be visible, and would be inhaled

without the victim’s knowledge. It is this profile which makes it impossible for

our troops to assume a reactive protective posture.

Even with appropriate data to assess a cloud’s predicted path of

movement, it would be difficult at best given varying weather and terrain

effects. Air stability, temperature, relative humidity, pollutants, cloud

coverage, and precipitation all affect biological warfare agent duration and

effectiveness. It is traditional to expect a biological warfare attack in the early

morning and late evening when air stability is optimal and direct sunlight is

minimal. As the agent aerosol is transported away from the site of initial

dissemination, it is subject to gradual dilution by dispersion, as well as to

decay resulting from the effects of sunlight and other environmental factors.

Dissemination Means

Anthrax can be disseminated by a wide variety of means. Missiles,

rockets, artillery, aerial bombs, and sprayers mounted on aircraft, cars, boats,

as well as hand-held sprayers, make effective dissemination means.

In the case of less efficient biological warfare delivery means, such as

bulk-fill missile warheads or artillery shells that detonate on impact, the area

of coverage for each kilogram of agent will be reduced. Even though a

significant percentage (as high as 95%) of the agent may not be effectively

aerosolized by bulk-fill weapons, the resulting exposure hazard in the

immediate area of the attack could have significant operational impact. Given

this scenario, we would still expect an infected area of 1 square kilometer per

kilogram, and some downwind exposure hazard for several kilometers.

Scenarios for Use

United States forces face a growing possibility of exposure to biological

agents in situations over a wide range of contingencies. At one end of the

spectrum is deliberate, high-concentration agent exposure resulting from an

enemy missile attack on a military facility. At the other end is lowconcentration

agent release caused by an accident at a foreign biological

warfare research and development facility that impacts our forces engaged in

peacekeeping operations.

The Threat

At least 10 countries have or are developing a biological warfare

capability. Several of these countries are suspected of developing anthrax as a

biological warfare agent. As offensive biological warfare programs proliferate

and expand, the exposure threat presented by some biological agents may well

become comparable to that attributed to the endemic disease hazards (for

example, diphtheria, influenza, and tetanus) for which our active-duty and

reserve personnel are now routinely vaccinated.

Iraq

Iraq admitted to weaponizing anthrax. They declared 10 Al-Husayn

Missiles, 50 R-400 bombs, and 3 MIG-21 with spray tanks. They also

acknowledged research on 155mm artillery shells, artillery rockets, and aerosol

generators. Iraq claimed to have destroyed these munitions, but to date UN

monitors have not been able to verify these claims. Iraq also declared 8,500

liters (2,245 gallons) of concentrated anthrax, as well as several other biological

warfare agents.

Al Hakam, a confirmed biological warfare Anthrax and Botulinum toxin

production facility in Iraq, was destroyed in 1996 by UNSCOM. Iraq had

maintained that it was a legitimate civilian facility designed to produce singlecell

proteins and bio-pesticides. Al Hakam’s remote location and the security

involved in its construction suggested that it was intended to be a biological

warfare production facility from the outset.

Experts conclude that Iraq retains sufficient technology components,

data, and scientific expertise to resume development and production of

biological weapons. Although the UNSCOM inspections severely curtailed Iraqi

WMD programs, even a small residual force of operational biological warfare

missiles would pose a serious threat to neighboring countries and U.S. military

forces in the region.

Iran

Iran has a growing biotech industry, significant pharmaceutical

experience, and the overall infrastructure to support its biological warfare

program. It continues to pursue dual-use biotech equipment and expertise

from Russian and other sources, ostensibly for civilian reasons. Iran has had a

limited capability to employ biological warfare agents since at least 1986.

Syria

We assess Syria is pursuing development of a biological warfare program

and has the biotechnical infrastructure capable of supporting limited agent

development. Syria’s mature chemical warfare program likely is a source of

biological weaponization technologies.

Libya

Libya’s biological warfare program most likely has not advanced beyond

the research and development stage, although they may be capable of

producing small quantities of biological warfare agent.

North Korea

Although little is known on North Korea’s biological warfare program, we

suspect they are capable of producing and weaponizing several biological

warfare agents, which include anthrax, cholera and plague.

Former Soviet Union

Since the inception of the biological warfare program prior to the Second

World War, the Soviet Ministry of Defense systematically improved their

biological warfare weapons characteristics and production capabilities for

anthrax. During the peak of the cold war, the Soviet Union had the capability

to produce thousands of tons of anthrax agent. Anthrax was considered the

‘backbone’ of the Former Soviet Union’s offensive biological warfare program.

Biological warfare in the Former Soviet Union has received substantial

press coverage over the past two years, to include a book entitled Biohazard by

Dr. Ken Alibek, the Former Soviet Union’s former Director of the premier

anthrax facility located in Stepnogorsk, Kazahkstan. These books detail many

events surrounding the capabilities of the Former Soviet Union with regard to

biological warfare agents, facilities, and weaponization.

Former Soviet Union biological warfare scientists have detailed the Soviet

research and development of anthrax as a biological warfare agent. The 1979

Sverdlovsk anthrax accident confirmed the Soviet Union’s production on the

bacteria, as well as the lethality of an anthrax aerosol cloud. Even prior to this

accident, a leak from an alleged defective reactor in the Kirov bacteriological

facility spread anthrax into the city’s sewer system. Although no deaths were

reported, an apparent new strain, more virulent than the original was isolated

in the sewer rats several years later.

We also know that the research goals of the Soviet biological warfare

program included the development of antibiotic resistance strains, and that

this was likely accomplished by the early 1990’s. To date, no information

corroborates development of a vaccine-resistant strain of anthrax biological

warfare agent.

Through scientific literature analysis, we have observed a continuing

robust Russian research, development, and production effort on the anthrax

organism. The difficulty is determining whether this ongoing effort at facilities

formerly associated with anthrax biological warfare agent work, is for legitimate

purposes or a continuation of offensive related activity.

According to Russia’s 1992 declaration of past biological warfare activity

to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), Russia admitted that

anthrax was an agent researched at Soviet Ministry of Defense facilities and its

‘effectiveness was evaluated’. While the declaration states that ‘only models of

biological ammunition and spray devices were ever developed’, Dr. Alibek and

others claim that by the mid 1980s, the Soviets had perfected delivery of

anthrax as a biological warfare agent using a wide range of delivery systems, to

include ballistic missiles.

Although the Former Soviet Union program has certainly been downsized

and restructured from the era where thousands of scientists engaged in

biological warfare development, the current status of all facilities is not known,

nor do we know the whereabouts of former biological warfare scientists

previously engaged in offensive activity.

China

China continues to maintain an offensive biological warfare program.

They possess a sufficiently advanced biotech infrastructure to allow

development of biological warfare agents. Additionally, its munitions industry

is capable of weaponizing of biological warfare agents.

Terrorism

Anthrax is also a potential terrorist weapon because of its relative ease of

production. It does not require conventional military equipment or personnel

for production or dissemination. Aerosol generators and spray equipment

needed for dissemination is commercially available, as are easily concealed

portable devices. These items could be used by terrorists in attacks against

military or civilian targets. Devices as simple as insecticide spray cans can be

used to introduce anthrax into heating, ventilating, and air conditioning

systems. Nevertheless, terrorists contemplating anthrax attacks face

technological challenges.

The Aum Shinrikyo sect reportedly had anthrax, and claimed to have

attempted dissemination of anthrax during several 1993 attacks in Tokyo using

improvised sprayers on buildings and trucks. They had difficulties with

clogged sprayers and the anthrax itself, but demonstrated the scientific

capability necessary to work with anthrax as a biological warfare agent.

Currently, while some international terrorist groups are interested in

developing the capability to use biological agents, other than the Aum

Shinrikyo’s past incidents, there are no confirmed indications that other

groups are specifically developing anthrax. International terrorist group

activities have primarily focused on chemical rather than biological materials.

Conclusions

In conclusion, anthrax represents the primary biological warfare threat

to United States forces and interests. It is the most widely adopted agent in

foreign biological warfare programs. An attack will likely come with little to no

warning with potential catastrophic impact. Because of this, anthrax deserves

its reputation as an effective and deadly biological warfare agent.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before this committee. I

will be pleased to respond to any questions you may have now, or may wish to

provide later.